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Summary: Using a framework that distinguishes autobiographical belief, recollective experience, and conﬁdence in memory, we
review three major paradigms used to suggest false childhood events to adults: imagination inﬂation, false feedback and memory
implantation. Imagination inﬂation and false feedback studies increase the belief that a suggested event occurred by a small
amount such that events are still thought unlikely to have happened. In memory implantation studies, some recollective experience
for the suggested events is induced on average in 47% of participants, but only in 15% are these experiences likely to be rated as
full memories. We conclude that susceptibility to false memories of childhood events appears more limited than has been
suggested. The data emphasise the complex judgements involved in distinguishing real from imaginary recollections and caution
against accepting investigator-based ratings as necessarily corresponding to participants’ self-reports. Recommendations are
made for presenting the results of these studies in courtroom settings.Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
The early 1990s saw a well-documented concern that some
psychotherapy patients might be wrongly convinced by their
therapists that they had experienced sexual abuse in child-
hood and recover corresponding memories of events that
had not occurred (Lindsay & Read, 1994; Loftus, 1993).
The possibility was raised that a variety of suggestive thera-
peutic techniques could create illusory memories of abuse
having happened. Subsequently, experiments were designed
that showed false memories of childhood events could be
created under laboratory conditions. Although the success
of these experiments has been widely accepted, summarising
their results accurately is complex because different
paradigms and memory measures have been employed, and
the ﬁndings have been very variable. This may explain
why to date there have been no systematic reviews of the
research on creating false childhood memories in adults de-
spite undoubted professional and public interest in the topic,
as illustrated by a recent special issue of Applied Cognitive
Psychology titled ‘Reshaping memories through conversa-
tions: Considering the inﬂuence of others on historical
memories of abuse’. The two aims of this review are to de-
velop a framework for describing the nature of these
laboratory-produced memories and to use this framework to
document more precisely what these studies have and have
not shown. The review should be of beneﬁt to researchers,
experts testifying in legal settings and psychotherapists
attempting to evaluate the status of childhood memories in
a therapeutic context.
Three experimental paradigms have been most commonly
employed to mimic possible therapy-inspired distortions to
childhood autobiographical memory (Laney & Loftus,
2013; Schacter & Loftus, 2013). In order of the amount of
explicit suggestion and apparent corroboration provided to
participants, these are the following: imagination inﬂation
studies, in which participants are instructed to repeatedly
imagine events that have not occurred; ‘false feedback’
studies, in which participants are given mainly generic false
information suggesting they were likely to have experienced
an event and memory implantation studies in which the
suggested occurrence of the false event is supported by false
testimony from an individual’s family members or individu-
ally doctored photographs. Although the latter two paradigms
overlap somewhat, we treat them separately here because
they typically differ both in the procedures used and the out-
come data (changes in self-ratings versus investigator-based
ratings). The majority of studies using all three of these
paradigms imply the practical relevance of their work by
including mention of memory for child abuse or trauma, ther-
apy or legal proceedings.
Some initial reactions to the publication of these studies
were to conclude that imagining events that had not
happened can ‘change memory’ (Garry & Polaschek, 2000)
or that it was easy to implant false childhood memories
(Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay, 2002). More recently,
articles have suggested that, on average, false childhood mem-
ories can be implanted in almost 40% of participants (Strange,
Wade, & Hayne, 2008). A State of the Science Editorial (Laney
& Loftus, 2013) concluded that ‘all these techniques produced
false memories in substantial numbers of research participants’
and went on to describe further research that has been ‘key to
establishing the reliability of laboratory-induced false memory,
as well as their relevance to the precipitating issue of recovered
memories of child sexual abuse’ (p. 139). Other authors
(Conway, 2013) have concluded that ‘wholly false memories
are more common than previously thought, especially for child-
hood events and, even more alarmingly, it turns out to be
almost trivially easy to create false memories in others’ (p. 567).
The ﬁndings of this research have also been widely
accepted within psychology textbooks, with statements (D.
A. Bernstein, 2014) such as: ‘Merely thinking about certain
objects or events or hearing sounds or seeing photos associ-
ated with them appears to make false memories of them
more likely’ (p. 223); or (Nolen-Hoeksema, Fredrickson,
Loftus, & Lutz, 2014) ‘memories of entirely ﬁctional events
have been shown to be implantable under controlled
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conditions…it is possible to induce such memories by
merely having people imagine ﬁctional renderings of their
pasts’ (pp. 289–290). In the absence of a systematic review,
however, it is unclear whether these statements accurately
capture the available data.
One reason for caution is that a number of researchers in
the ﬁeld have observed how studies vary considerably in their
deﬁnition and operationalisation of false memory (Scoboria,
Mazzoni, Kirsch, & Relyea, 2004; Smeets, Merckelbach,
Horselenberg, & Jelicic, 2005). Moreover, discriminating
whether one’s memories are true or false is a complex process
involving high-level evaluative procedures (Johnson, 1997;
Lindsay & Johnson, 2000). Perhaps as a consequence, the
results of studies using all three paradigms have been highly
variable. These observations suggest the value of applying an
explicit framework to the existing data in order to evaluate the
literature. In this article, we describe such a framework
grounded in the previous work of autobiographical memory
researchers and apply it to the results of the three major
methods of suggesting false childhood memories.
A FRAMEWORK FOR DISCRIMINATING TRUTH
AND FALSITY IN ONE’S OWN
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES
The term ‘autobiographical memory’ refers to the totality of
what can be recalled about the self and includes knowledge
of both facts and events. In thinking about event memory,
a useful starting point is the ‘remember-know’ distinction
(Mandler, 1980; Tulving, 1985) that has been so inﬂuential
in experimental studies of episodic memory retrieval: Partic-
ipants can experience their past knowledge of a stimulus
event either as a feeling of familiarity (‘knowing’ they have
seen it before without retrieving the context) or as a full
recollective experience accompanied by sensory images aris-
ing from the original context (‘remembering’). With autobio-
graphical memory, individuals can similarly know or believe
on the basis of external evidence that an event has occurred
(such that they visited New York when aged 2years) without
necessarily having any corresponding recollective experi-
ence such as visual images.
Unlike memory for laboratory stimuli, however, for which
feelings of familiarity provide the main source of ‘know’
judgments, the belief that an autobiographical event has
occurred may rest on a wide variety of additional types of
plausibility information either known to the individuals con-
cerned or supplied by others (e.g. pictures of the family visit
to New York). Such information is important to evaluate the
plausibility of speciﬁc recollective experiences. Just as it is
possible to know or believe something occurred without
recollection, it is possible to have recollection without belief:
An example is when a recollective experience such as a visual
image is thought to be inaccurate or completely false
(Mazzoni, Scoboria, & Harvey, 2010; Scoboria et al.,
2014). Observations of such non-believed recollective
experiences have featured from the start in studies of false
memory implantation (Hyman, Husband, & Billings, 1995).
Even if the event referred to in the recollective experience
is plausible, the elements of that experience may still be
imaginary rather than real. Research on source memory has
considered in detail the problems of establishing the truth
of one’s own recollective experiences and emphasised the
complexity of the evaluative processes involved (Johnson,
2006). Johnson suggested that a variety of factors are in-
volved, including the amount of perceptual and contextual
detail available, the plausibility of what is recalled, the exis-
tence of supporting knowledge and beliefs, information
about mental operations such as imagination that might pro-
vide an alternative explanation and the decision criteria
adopted. Based on existing ﬁndings, she proposed that false
memories are more likely when procedures are used that in-
crease the similarity between true and imagined events, such
as those that increase the amount of imagery available, that
decrease the accessibility of disconﬁrming information and
that lead to features of real events being imported.
Given these complexities in discriminating whether expe-
riences correspond to true or false events, it has been neces-
sary to stipulate criteria by which researchers can conclude
that individuals have fully recollected a particular episode
from their past. A prominent view from autobiographical
memory research (Brewer, 1986) is that three elements are
needed: the belief that the episode was personally experi-
enced by the self, the presence of (usually visual) imagery
and the conﬁdence that this imagery is a veridical record of
the originally experienced episode. Similar criteria have been
employed by other leading researchers. Pezdek and col-
leagues suggested that recollective experiences are only
likely to be accepted if the events are initially judged as plau-
sible and consistent with script-relevant knowledge (Pezdek,
Finger, & Hodge, 1997). Hyman additionally proposed that
the creation of false memories involves the acceptance of
the false event as plausible, the construction of an image
and narrative of the event and the source memory error of
confusing the constructed memory as a personal recollection
(Hyman, Gilstrap, Decker, & Wilkinson, 1998). A related
model (Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001) distinguished
between a perception that an autobiographical event is plau-
sible, the belief that it occurred to them and a corresponding
recollective experience that is interpreted as a memory.
Empirical research supports the argument that it is impor-
tant to distinguish between these different kinds of judge-
ment. For example, telling people that certain events, such
as receiving an enema, were highly prevalent during their
childhood produces greater belief in the possibility of having
experienced those events, but not actual memories of the
experience (Hart & Schooler, 2006; Pezdek, Blandon-Gitlin,
Lam, Hart & Schooler, 2006). Similarly, in false feedback
studies, increases in the belief that an event has occurred
have been noted even in participants who later say they are
positive that the event did not happen (D. M. Bernstein,
Laney, Morris, & Loftus, 2005b). Other research has found
that whereas perceptual, re-experiencing and emotional fea-
tures of an event predict recollective experience but not a be-
lief that the event actually occurred, event plausibility
strongly predicts a belief that the event occurred but only
weakly predicts recollective experience (Scoboria et al.,
2014).
Some authors of studies using the three main childhood
false memory paradigms explicitly refer to both a belief in
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an event having occurred and recollective experiences as
‘memories’ (Laney, Fowler, Nelson, Bernstein, & Loftus,
2008) and Scoboria et al. (2014) note that it is often far from
easy to distinguish between different types of memory
judgement. A problem with studies using investigator ratings
of memory accounts is that memory terms are sometimes not
understood or used correctly by those taking part in memory
studies, and their responses can be affected by ambiguous
wording (Smeets et al., 2006). For example, Smeets and col-
leagues (Smeets, Telgen, Ost, Jelicic, & Merckelbach, 2009)
found that two-thirds of their participants appeared to
endorse having ‘memories’ of non-existent footage of the
assassination of the Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn, but more
detailed questioning determined that in 80% of cases, their
statements referred to beliefs rather than recollective experi-
ences. Thus, while to outside observers, there may appear to
be a ‘memory’ based on the language used, subjectively the
individual may believe the event occurred without having an
accompanying recollective experience (Ost, Granhag, Udell,
& Roos af Hjelmsäter, 2008; Otgaar, Scoboria, & Smeets,
2013). Even if there is a recollective experience, this may
not be believed (Mazzoni et al., 2010; Scoboria et al., 2014).
Synthesising this previous body of work, it appears that
there is considerable support for the utility of Brewer’s
(1986) framework distinguishing three types of memory
judgement: (1) a belief that the event occurred (termed here
‘autobiographical belief’); (2) a corresponding recollective
experience; and (3) conﬁdence in the veracity of that mem-
ory experience (termed here ‘memory conﬁdence’). While
autobiographical belief is a component of memory, we sug-
gest that a ‘full’ memory for an event, whether true or false,
should ideally rest on the combination of the second and
third elements. We refer to recollective experiences that have
not been demonstrated to be held with conﬁdence as ‘partial’
memories.
These three types of memory judgement are readily
discerned in the literature. Table 1 presents some of the most
widely used self-report measures and investigator-based
(false) memory deﬁnitions that have been employed in imag-
ination inﬂation, false feedback and memory implantation
studies. As previously remarked by several authors, most
imagination inﬂation and false feedback studies have primar-
ily assessed autobiographical belief and have had partici-
pants rate their conﬁdence that an event has occurred,
typically on an 8-point scale anchored with ‘deﬁnitely did
not happen’ at one end and ‘deﬁnitely did happen’ at the
other. Several researchers (Mazzoni et al., 2001; Smeets
et al., 2005) have noted, further, that increases in conﬁdence
cannot be assumed to correspond to a belief that an event has
occurred if conﬁdence ratings remain in the lower half of the
scale (i.e. closer to ‘did not happen’ than to ‘did happen’).
Therefore, in summarising the literature, it is important to de-
scribe not only the scales that are used but also the mean rat-
ings before and after any intervention.
The self-report measures used in the imagination inﬂation
and false feedback studies to assess recollective experience
generally ask participants to rank their experience on a scale
from ‘no memory at all’ to a ‘clear and complete memory’ or
to contrast a ‘memory’ with a ‘belief’ that an event hap-
pened. These methods rely on participants distinguishing
beliefs and recollective experiences, but do not explicitly
require participants to describe images or recount narratives,
or to consider whether such images are necessarily veridical.
Particularly when ‘memories’ are simply being contrasted
with ‘beliefs’ in a dichotomous rating, little information is
available about the extent of the memory or of the individ-
ual’s conﬁdence in it.
The memory implantation studies have, in contrast,
primarily relied on investigator-based ratings and have
gone to considerable lengths to characterise the nature of
participants’ response. From the beginning, investigators
recognised that many participants were uncertain about
their recollective experiences and attempted to distinguish
‘partial’ memories (e.g. memories that were vague, incom-
plete or not necessarily believed to be real) from ‘full’ or
‘complete’ memories (Hyman et al., 1995; Loftus &
Pickrell, 1995). This has been difﬁcult because of the need
to separate participants’ memory of what they were asked
to imagine by the experimenters, often over repeated
sessions, from their depiction of what they believed actually
happened to them. For this reason, as shown in Table 1,
several investigators have required participants to elaborate
or to produce information additional to what was suggested.
However, this additional material also needs to be accepted
as true in relation to the suggested event (i.e. ‘memory conﬁ-
dence’ also needs to be assessed).
One of the most stringent formulations has been that of
Hyman and Pentland (1996), who deﬁned ‘clear’ memories
as reports of a core aspect of the target event with ‘consistent
elaborations and statements that the event was a memory’.
Reading the published examples produced by this method
(e.g. Hyman & Billings, 1998), however, illustrates that even
in the case of ‘clear’ memories, participants are sometimes
unconﬁdent about their experiences or incorporate elements
from their own biography that do not always ﬁt the
suggested scenarios. Other investigators have equally
recognised that a visual image may not always be classiﬁed
as an actual memory but have sometimes been less speciﬁc
about requiring evidence of conﬁdence in memory when
deﬁning a ‘full’ recollection, for example, by using as a
criterion ‘if the subject appeared to believe he or she was
remembering the suggested event’ (Lindsay, Hagen, Read,
Wade, & Garry, 2004) (p. 151).
Although many individual false memory studies discuss
the distinctions between autobiographical belief, recollective
experience or memory conﬁdence in relation to their data,
these constructs have not been used as a frame of reference
for organising and summarising the results of the ﬁeld as a
whole. In the sections that follow, we review the evidence
for change in memory for childhood events brought about
by each of the three primary false memory paradigms. In
seeking to quantify this, we follow the literature in de-
scribing the proportion of participants who respond to
suggestions and the amount and nature of mean changes on
the memory scales employed. Because it is these raw, unad-
justed data that best capture the degree of change achieved, a
meta-analytic approach that converted the data into
standardised effect sizes would be inappropriate: Instead,
we have calculated weighted means that preserve the original
metrics. This analytic approach also allows for the fact that
Creating false childhood memories
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the memory implantation studies do not consistently report
appropriate contrast conditions from which an effect size
could be calculated: Although participants are usually
required to recall true as well as false events, when the data
are reported, there are generally differences in the numbers
of events, the procedures used or the way they are coded,
which prevents more general comparison. Meta-analysis of
the imagination inﬂation and false feedback studies would
in any case be of limited value because of the insufﬁciently
frequent inclusion of theoretically relevant moderator
variables. As summarised in the tables, the vast majority of
the 61 studies included in this review were conducted with
young adults in mainly college student populations (only
four included older adults): Consideration of false memories
in children is beyond the scope of the paper.
IMAGINATION INFLATION
Vividly imagining large numbers of words, sentences,
actions, and so on can lead to confusion over whether spe-
ciﬁc words have been spoken or speciﬁc actions performed
or whether this only happened in the person’s imagination.
The act of imagining such actions can lead to an increase
in the belief that they actually happened (Anderson, 1984;
Foley, Johnson, & Raye, 1983). Researchers applying simi-
lar procedures to childhood memories (Garry, Manning,
Loftus, & Sherman, 1996) coined the term ‘imagination
inﬂation’. In the studies to be reviewed, participants typically
complete a checklist of distinctive events that might have
happened in childhood (such as getting stuck in a tree or put-
ting one’s hand through a window), rating them on an auto-
biographical belief/event conﬁdence scale. Events (usually
those rated as unlikely to have occurred) are then assigned
either to an ‘imagine’ or a control condition and subse-
quently re-rated for likelihood of having occurred. The
experimenter typically guides the participants’ imagination
with speciﬁc instructions to focus on different attributes of
the ‘memory’, augmented with the requirement subsequently
to answer questions about the event as if it had happened, to
write in detail about the hypothetical event or both.
Method
A search was conducted on Web of Science, Current
Contents and MEDLINE using the topic search term ‘imag-
ination inﬂation’. To be included, a study had to contain
distinct conditions measuring increases in the belief that a
childhood autobiographical event had happened after an
imagination manipulation and in a non-imagination (control)
condition, report sufﬁcient data to allow these conditions to
be contrasted and measure autobiographical belief both
before and after the manipulation. Of the 156 potential arti-
cles found up to the end of 2015, 12 met the inclusion criteria.
Additional hand-searching of cited and citing references pro-
duced a further four qualifying articles, resulting in a total of
16 articles incorporating 19 different datasets. Data were
extracted independently and cross-checked by both authors.
The studies are summarised in Table 2. In the third col-
umn, this details any additional relevant within-subjects
and between-subjects conditions that featured in the studies
over and above the test of the imagination inﬂation effect.
The remaining columns present the results. In the literature,
tests of the imagination inﬂation effect are reported in a
number of different ways. Early studies typically reported
the percentage of all events that received increased
belief/conﬁdence ratings after the intervention, regardless
of the magnitude of the increase, divided by whether they
were imagined or not imagined. This method, which col-
lapses datapoints across events and participants, gives an
indication numerically of whether any imagination inﬂation
has occurred. However, unlike within-subjects designs in
which the participant remains the unit of analysis, the non-
independence of observations compromises the application
of conventional statistical tests. Where such data are
reported, they are tabulated in the fourth column of Table 2,
along with any restrictions (e.g. percentages only calculated
on events initially rated as unlikely to have occurred). The
speciﬁc events imagined are not described as there were
often multiple events, and these were not necessarily the
same for all participants.
This way of presenting the results is silent about the
amount of any increase and where this occurs on the
belief/conﬁdence scale, impeding quantiﬁcation and inter-
pretation of the effects (Horselenberg et al., 2000; Pezdek
& Eddy, 2001). One solution has been to compare the means
of the same items when they were imagined and not imag-
ined (i.e. treating items as cases). The consequent non-
independence of observations once again compromises the
application of conventional statistical tests. Reliable
estimates of the presence of a signiﬁcant imagination inﬂa-
tion effect can however be obtained from tests based on mean
scores for individual participants, providing that the tests’
assumptions are not violated (Garry et al., 1996). The next
column of Table 2 therefore reports, where available, the re-
sults of such between-group statistical tests. These include
comparisons of post-intervention group means adjusted for
pre-intervention means, comparisons of group change scores
and tests of time by group interactions in repeated-measures
ANOVAs. The ﬁnal two columns quantify the size of this
effect in terms of the mean increase on the 8-point scale and
whether this increase takes the average score above the scale
midpoint. It was not possible to quantify the effect by
reporting the number of participants whose scores moved
from below to above the midpoint as these data were rarely
reported.
Results and discussion
The studies are relatively homogeneous in that, with some
exceptions, participants imagine events initially rated as
unlikely that occurred to them before the age of 10 years.
Visual inspection of the percentages of all memories with
increased belief ratings after events that had been either imag-
ined or not imagined (Table 2, column 4) indicates a very
consistent advantage for the imagined condition, even though
it was only a minority of participants who changed their
ratings (Garry, Sharman, Wade, Hunt, & Smith, 2001).
Consistent with these data are the changes in mean ratings
for the imagined and control conditions shown in column 6
of Table 2, where these are available. Visual inspection
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conﬁrms that in the great majority of cases, positive mean
change is higher after imagination versus control conditions.
Seventeen out of the 19 datasets reported valid tests of the
imagination inﬂation effect for a belief that the event had
happened based on individuals’ mean scores. As shown in
Table 2, 11 of these found a statistically signiﬁcant differ-
ence in the belief as a result of imagining versus not imagin-
ing and six did not. In two datasets (Sharman & Barnier,
2008; Sharman & Scoboria, 2009), there was additionally
an imagination inﬂation effect for recollective experience
measured by means of a memory scale, but the number of
participants with clear complete memories was not reported
in either study. A similar effect was not found in the only
other study assessing memory (Bays, Zabrucky, & Gagne,
2012). Of the 14 datasets reporting means pre-intervention
and post-intervention, 13 found that the increase attributable
to imagination over the non-imagination control condition
was equivalent to 1 point or less on the 8-point scale (or on
a 7-point scale in the Horselenberg et al. studies) and that
mean scores remained in the lower half of the scale. In one
study reporting such data, Garry et al. (1996) noted that large
jumps to eight on the post-test conﬁdence scale occurred for
six of the 112 imagined items and two of the 119 not-
imagined items.
In one exception to this general pattern of results
(Sharman & Barnier, 2008), mean belief ratings for imagined
negatively and positively valenced childhood events jumped
from 1.86 to 5.50 and 2.02 to 5.54, respectively. Increases
were also larger than average in the control condition, with
ratings rising from 1.82 to 3.72, and from 1.97 to 4.19, for
negatively and positively valenced events, respectively.
The data indicate fairly conclusively that on average the
imagination inﬂation paradigm increases participants’ beliefs
that events, originally perceived as unlikely to have hap-
pened, are more likely to have occurred than they ﬁrst esti-
mated. The procedure inﬂuences a minority of participants,
and to date, the effects appear to be small in magnitude.
Post-test ratings tended to fall below the scale midpoint,
and it has been suggested that this effect can be more accu-
rately characterised as reducing the belief that the event did
not happen rather than increasing the belief that the event
did happen (Mazzoni et al., 2001; Smeets et al., 2005). From
a source memory perspective (Johnson, 1997, 2006), accep-
tance of the suggested event is likely to be increased by the
additional available imagery, but the effect may be limited
by participants’ awareness of the mental operations that pre-
ceded the eventual judgements.
An alternative explanation for the effect raised in the ini-
tial study by Garry et al. (1996) was that because most events
are selected for having low conﬁdence ratings initially, part
of the effect may consist of regression to the mean. Consis-
tent with this possibility, Pezdek and Eddy (2001) reported
that whereas autobiographical belief increased during the
course of the experiment for events initially rated as unlikely
to have occurred, it decreased for events initially rated as
likely to have occurred. The plausibility of this explanation
can be assessed by inspecting the mean change in belief that
occurred for control events also selected for being unlikely to
have occurred. Regression effects should increase autobio-
graphical belief for these events too. Table 2 indicates that
in the nine datasets that reported a signiﬁcant imagination
inﬂation effect and gave the relevant group means, a change
in autobiographical belief shown by the control group was
positive in ﬁve cases and negative in four cases. This suggests
that regression to the mean is unlikely to have made a
substantial contribution to imagination inﬂation.
Another possibility discussed originally by Garry et al.
(1996) is that imagination procedures can actually lead to
the retrieval of true memories and that this explains at least
some of the increase in subsequent conﬁdence. In particular,
the repeated opportunity to retrieve childhood events may
result in hypermnesia (Erdelyi, 2010) such that true memories
are spontaneously recovered (Hyman et al., 1995; Hyman &
Pentland, 1996). In one of the few studies to have addressed
this possibility, Mazzoni and Memon (2003) employed as
events a medical procedure (having a skin sample taken from
a little ﬁnger) that was known not to have been used in the
country where the study was conducted and compared it with
another procedure [having a milk (baby) tooth extracted] that
was. This design ensured that any increase in conﬁdence
about the ‘impossible’ event occurring could not be attributed
to a true memory. While conﬁdence increased for both
events, the magnitude of the increase obtained for the ‘impos-
sible’ event was very small (less than half a scale point).
Moreover, interpretation of statistical signiﬁcance of their
results was complicated by the combination of both events
in the analysis and by the simultaneous decreased conﬁdence
in the control group who did not imagine the events.
Although the possibility that recall of true events might
account for a proportion of the imagination inﬂation effect
was not ruled out by the Mazzoni and Memon (2003) study,
it seems unlikely to have been an important contributor to
results using the original Life Events Inventory (LEI). This
is because in that measure childhood events were quite spe-
ciﬁc, low-frequency occurrences (e.g. ‘Broke a window with
your hand’). This factor may, however, account for the ex-
ceptionally strong effects achieved by Sharman and Barnier
(2008) who developed their own version of the LEI,
replacing most of the original items with positive and nega-
tive events (Stefanie J. Sharman, personal communication 4
December 2014). Relative to the standard LEI, the descrip-
tion of the events presented as examples appears to have been
less distinctive and to have included an element of judgement
or interpretation (e.g. ‘you gave someone a gift for no special
reason’). These features raise the possibility (i) that events
were more easily overlooked when initially rated for belief
in occurrence and (ii) that guided imagination was more
likely to have prompted recall of a genuine past experience.
FALSE FEEDBACK
A second group of studies has attempted to increase belief in
childhood autobiographical events by providing false feed-
back to participants. In a typical design, participants com-
plete a number of measures, including the conﬁdence with
which they believe certain events happened to them before
the age of 10 (for example, that they liked or did not like
certain foods), before being provided with false feedback
and re-rating their conﬁdence in the event happening to
C. R. Brewin and B. Andrews
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them. The studies we review provide feedback ostensibly
from a computer programme or psychotherapist, indicating
that a particular event or preference was likely to have hap-
pened or applied to the participant at that age. The study
may involve imagining the event or answering questions
about it (i.e. using imagination inﬂation procedures) prior
to the ﬁnal re-rating of conﬁdence. A few of these studies
also recorded the extent to which following feedback partic-
ipants had some indication of an actual memory of the sug-
gested event, rather than believing it had happened without
being able to remember it.
A separate question of interest is the extent to which those
who respond positively to the false feedback (typically called
‘Believers’ in these studies) differ from those who do not
respond (‘Non-believers’). ‘Believers’ are typically deﬁned
as responding to the intervention with at least a 1 point in-
crease in conﬁdence and reporting some belief or memory
for the target event, although they are not required to report
high levels of autobiographical belief and/or a recollective
experience (D. M. Bernstein, Laney, Morris, & Loftus,
2005a; D. M. Bernstein et al., 2005b). As the primary focus
of this review is to document the effects of false feedback
versus no false feedback on autobiographical belief and
recollective experience, means reported in Table 3 refer to
the entire subsample exposed to the various conditions.
However, secondary analyses concerning ‘Believers’ within
qualifying studies are discussed in the text.
Method
A search was conducted on Web of Science, Current
Contents and MEDLINE using the joint topic search terms
‘false memor*’ and ‘childhood’. To be included, a study
had to compare a false feedback condition in which individ-
ual participants were given speciﬁc information suggesting
they personally were likely to have experienced the event
with a no-feedback control condition and measure autobio-
graphical belief or recollective experience both before and
after the feedback. The search produced 350 potential
articles up to the end of 2015, and additional hand-searching
of cited and citing references produced a further ﬁve. Of
these 15 articles, incorporating 20 different datasets met the
aforementioned criteria. Data were extracted independently
and cross-checked by both authors.
The data are summarised in Table 3, which in column 3
records the speciﬁc childhood event being suggested and
additional relevant experimental conditions. Column 4
indicates whether there was a signiﬁcant false feedback effect
in comparison with the control condition. Tests purely on
within-group changes in belief before and after the manipula-
tion are not reported, as these may be attributable to regres-
sion to the mean or other artefacts of repeated testing. The
next two columns quantify the effects obtained by reporting
the mean increase on the 8-point scale typically used and
whether the mean increase after false feedback exceeded the
scale midpoint. The ﬁnal column reports the percentage of
participants who described themselves as remembering or,
in the absence of an actual memory, believing that the
suggested event had occurred.
Results and discussion
Once again, the studies are relatively homogeneous in that
most participants imagine events that occurred to them be-
fore the age of 10 years. Visual inspection in Table 3 of the
mean increased belief ratings before and after false feedback
indicates a very consistent advantage for this condition over
the control condition. However, like in the imagination inﬂa-
tion studies, analyses of ‘Believers’ indicate that it was usu-
ally the minority of study participants who showed clear
evidence of responding positively to the intervention (range
18%, in Bernstein et al., 2005a, Study 1, to 53%, in Laney,
Morris, Bernstein, Wakeﬁeld, & Loftus, 2008, Study 2).
The mean advantage for the false feedback over the no
false feedback condition is conﬁrmed by the reported statis-
tics, shown in Table 3, column 4. In the 15 datasets with
between-group tests on mean conﬁdence ratings, 13 found
that these differences were signiﬁcant, one obtained mixed
results, and one found no signiﬁcant differences. As shown
in Table 3, column 5, of the 19 datasets where the means
or mean change in belief are reported, four involve a maxi-
mum increase of less than 1 scale point with false feedback,
seven involve a maximum increase of 1–2 scale points and
eight a maximum of more than 2 scale points. Only one
study reported a belief increase beyond the scale midpoint.
Six of the eight datasets reporting these larger increases used
guided imagery in addition to false feedback, whereas only
one of the 11 datasets reporting smaller increases did so
(Clifaseﬁ, Bernstein, Mantonakis, & Loftus, 2013). There
is also some indication that the target of the false feedback
may play a role in determining the size of the effect. For
example, participants’ belief ratings actually decreased after
false feedback that they had been sick after eating chocolate
chip cookies, whereas three of the largest conﬁdence
increases came after false feedback concerning attitudes to
asparagus.
Studying the subset of participants (‘Believers’) who
appear to succumb to the false feedback provides an estimate
of the maximum effect that can be achieved. Typically ‘Be-
lievers’ reported an increase on the autobiographical belief
scale that ranged from 1 to 2 points, remaining below the
scale midpoint, for an event at a theme park (Berkowitz,
Laney, Morris, Garry, & Loftus, 2008) to 3–5 points,
increasing beyond the scale midpoint, for food-related events
(D. M. Bernstein et al., 2005a, 2005b; Laney et al., 2008;
Laney et al., 2008; Scoboria, Mazzoni, Jarry, & Bernstein,
2012). In some cases, belief ratings recorded by ‘Believers’
after false feedback were as high as 6.48 on the 8-point scale
(Laney et al., 2008).
A number of false feedback studies also attempted to
assess the extent to which participants ‘remembered’ the sug-
gested events rather than just increased their belief they were
likely to have happened. Some included ‘memory’ scales as
well as ‘belief’ scales at pre-test and post-test (Table 1): Of
these, two datasets indicated a signiﬁcant increase with false
feedback (Scoboria et al., 2012; Sharman & Calacouris,
2010) and two did not (Scoboria, Lynn, Hessen, & Fisico,
2007, Studies 1 and 2).
Alternatively, investigators have assessed recollective
experience at post-test only. In an early study (Mazzoni,
Creating false childhood memories
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Loftus, Seitz, & Lynn, 1999), ‘some evidence of having a
memory’ was found in 44% of the false feedback group,
but the majority of the memories presented were clearly
speculations or outside the required age range. A number
of subsequent studies had their participants choose between
indicating that they had a memory of a target event, that they
believed the event had occurred but had no memory of it or
that they did not believe the event had occurred. These data,
shown in Table 3, reveal a wide range of different outcomes:
Across ﬁve datasets, the proportion of participants ‘remem-
bering’ ranged from 2% to 30%. All the datasets with higher
rates of ‘remembering’ involved experiences with foods
(Laney et al., 2008, Studies 1 and 2; Laney et al., 2008;
Scoboria et al., 2012).
Of the studies identifying a subset of ‘Believers’, the pro-
portion endorsing a ‘memory’ as opposed to a ‘belief’ fell
between 0% and 20% in studies suggesting the participant
had been ill after eating something (D. M. Bernstein et al.,
2005a, 2005b) or had had a speciﬁc experience at a theme
park (Berkowitz et al., 2008). This proportion reached 40%
in a study suggesting being sick after drinking alcohol
(Clifaseﬁ et al., 2013) and 20–50% in studies involving like
or dislike of asparagus (Laney et al., 2008; Laney et al.,
2008). A study that provided personalised false feedback
suggesting that the participant had been sick on peach
yoghourt reported that 20% of this group ‘remembered’ the
event with their mean scores on a recollective experience
scale reaching 6.82 out of 8 (Scoboria et al., 2012).
False feedback studies have shown consistently that par-
ticipants’ autobiographical beliefs can be manipulated under
certain experimental conditions, obtaining somewhat stron-
ger average effects than the imagination inﬂation studies.
This appears to be a robust effect found across a wide variety
of suggested events. The pattern is similar to the imagination
inﬂation studies in that the majority of participants do not
increase their conﬁdence ratings.
Again consistent with the source memory framework
(Johnson, 2006), larger increases in conﬁdence are found
for events that are more likely to correspond to real-life expe-
riences. For example, a minority of individuals do respond
strongly to false feedback concerning experiences of eating
certain foods, particularly if they are novel. It has been sug-
gested that false feedback concerning having been sick as a
child may be much more likely to be accepted if the food is
associated with unpleasant odours (such as egg salad) or is
sour (like yoghourt) (Pezdek & Freyd, 2009). They propose
that such effects are likely to be restricted to less appealing
foods that are less often consumed. While it is true that the
increases in conﬁdence about having been sick on chocolate
chip cookies or strawberry ice cream were much lower than
after egg salad, suggestions about both liking and hating
asparagus led to substantial changes in conﬁdence. The im-
plication is that individuals have complex and differentiated
attitudes towards different food types that permit a variety
of opportunities for suggestion to alter memory.
As in the imagination inﬂation studies, increased levels of
conﬁdence rarely exceeded the scale midpoint, so that the
results might be regarded as describing a reduction in disbe-
lief rather than a positive belief in the event’s occurrence.
The one exception was the study by Sharman and Scoboria
(2009). Rather than the distinctive events used in the original
LEI, their version consisted of less speciﬁc but highly plau-
sible achievement and afﬁliation events such as ‘You en-
couraged a friend or sibling’ and ‘You worked very carefully
on an important project’ (Stefanie J. Sharman, personal com-
munication 8 February 2015). A large increase in belief even
in the absence of false feedback suggests that, as in Sharman
and Barnier’s (2008) imagination inﬂation study, the nature
of these events may have been more effective in triggering
actual memories.
However, the false feedback research has also involved
memory for events prior to age 3 years (Mazzoni & Loftus,
1998; Mazzoni et al., 1999), memory for interactions at
Disneyland (Berkowitz et al., 2008) and memory for bone
screening (Scoboria et al., 2007). Thus, although for many
of the studies, it is difﬁcult to rule out some contribution
from actual experience, the range of events studied makes
this implausible as an explanation for all the effects obtained.
In comparison with the imagination inﬂation studies, there
has been greater interest in assessing recollective experience
as opposed to belief. Rates have been highly inconsistent
across studies, and even among ‘Believers’, the range
reporting any recollective experience has varied from 0%
to 50%. Investigators have relied primarily on self-report,
for example, requiring participants to decide whether their
experience could best be described as a memory or a belief.
This way of structuring the question does not address issues
of memory conﬁdence. The examples provided by Mazzoni
et al. (1999) illustrate the wide range of likely ‘memories’
participants in this paradigm may produce. Participants have
sometimes been required to write down what they remem-
bered, and it would be valuable to conduct analyses of these
more detailed reports, or classify them according to their
appropriateness, clarity or completeness. Whereas effects
on autobiographical belief are well established, it is probably
premature to generalise about the effects of false feedback on
‘full’ memories and important to note that such recollective
experiences as are produced may correspond in part to actual
experiences rather than to ones that never happened.
MEMORY IMPLANTATION
The ﬁnal group of studies, involving the paradigm with the
strongest explicit suggestion, has attempted to ‘implant’ a
memory of a childhood autobiographical event from scratch,
by providing explicit ‘corroboration’ from an authoritative
source that the event happened. In a typical design, a parent
of the experimental participant is contacted to conﬁrm or dis-
conﬁrm whether their child experienced a number of speci-
ﬁed childhood events. The experimenter usually targets a
particular event as the false event (e.g. being lost in a shop-
ping mall or a ride in a hot air balloon), and if the parent
indicates it did not happen, the participant is included in the
study. Subsequently, participants are encouraged to recall
over two or three sessions the details of the false event they
are misleadingly told the parent has conﬁrmed as happening.
In some cases, they may be shown a doctored photograph that
supposedly illustrates their presence at the false event. Unlike
the imagination inﬂation and false feedback paradigms, no
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systematic baseline measures of belief are taken, and the
focus is predominantly on the nature of any recollection.
After and during the recall attempts, participants are
instructed to provide accounts of the false event and some-
times of comparison true events that have actually been con-
ﬁrmed by the parent. In some studies, as in the other
paradigms, they are also guided to imagine the false events
as if they had happened. These accounts are then rated for
their correspondence to a complete memory, by the investiga-
tors as well as sometimes by the participants themselves.
Method
To be included, a study had to contain a procedure (i)
designed to produce a memory of a childhood autobiograph-
ical event that on another’s authority had not occurred and
(ii) that employed ‘corroboration’ speciﬁc to the individual
participant (such as conﬁrmation by their own family mem-
bers that the event had happened). From the previously
conducted search on Web of Science, Current Contents and
MEDLINE, using the joint topic search terms ‘false memor*’
and ‘childhood’, reported in False Feedback Section, 19
articles met the inclusion criteria. Additional hand-searching
of cited and citing references produced a further two articles.
After omitting one study in which the target event employed
by the researchers contained both true and false segments
(Žeželj, Pajić, Omanović, Ninković, & Grčić, 2009), a total
of 20 articles incorporating 22 different datasets resulted.
Data were extracted independently and cross-checked by
both authors.
The data are summarised in Table 4, which in column 3
details the nature of false events suggested and any relevant
between-subjects conditions. Column 4 indicates if the
procedures involved instructions to imagine the false event
or not, and the data are presented in columns 5–8. As previ-
ously discussed in A Framework for Discriminating Truth
and Falsity in One’s Own Autobiographical Memories
Section, and detailed in Table 1, there have been several
investigator-based rating systems for categorising partici-
pants’ recollective experiences. Which of the data columns
in Table 4 is populated depends on the particular system
used. Column 5 reports the percentage of participants de-
scribing any recollective experience associated with the false
events, including images, memories that were vague, uncer-
tain or partial and speculations. Column 6 reports the per-
centage of participants describing stronger false recollective
experiences that still did not reach our criteria for a ‘full’
memory of requiring evidence for conﬁdence in the
recollective experience. These include any recollective expe-
riences left after images not corresponding to memories were
explicitly excluded, or experiences where autobiographical
belief was measured and incorporated into the false memory
rating but conﬁdence in memory was not. Column 7 reports
the percentage of participants describing clear memories of
false recollective experiences after both images not corre-
sponding to memories and other forms of partial memory
were explicitly excluded by the rating system and where
there was evidence of conﬁdence in the memory. The ﬁnal
data column gives the means of any self-report measures of
memory for the false event. Included are a measure of
autobiographical belief (‘belief in event’), measures that
attempt to distinguish whether the participant has a belief
or a memory (‘know-remember’, ‘memory/belief form’), a
measure assessing recollective experience (‘memory extent’)
and a measure assessing conﬁdence in the recollective expe-
rience (‘memory conﬁdence’).
Results and discussion
Once again, there is a fairly homogeneous set of studies with
participants mainly recalling events supposed to have hap-
pened before the age of 10 years, but in one case recalling
events from ages 11–14 years (Shaw & Porter, 2015). The
percentage of participants reporting any recollective experi-
ence (Table 4, column 5) associated with the suggested false
event, no matter how vague, uncertain or speculative, ranged
from 12% (Hyman & Pentland, 1996, spilt punchbowl at
wedding, ‘think’ condition) to 93% (Shaw & Porter, 2015,
committed a criminal act). Rates for studies including plausi-
ble and implausible events (Pezdek et al., 1997) were aver-
aged across both sorts of event. The weighted average was
47.00% (median 34%). Rates within individual studies
varied considerably according to the speciﬁc intervention
employed and conditions tested. Thus, excluding the two
studies that did not employ imagery across all conditions
(Hyman & Pentland, 1996; Qin, Ogle, & Goodman, 2008),
the weighted mean percentage was 46.3% for the 12 studies
using guided imagery but 26.8% for the eight studies not
using imagery (Mann–Whitney test z=3.17, p< .01). Pro-
viding an actual school photo increased the percentage of
participants ‘recalling’ putting a manufactured compound
called Slime in a teacher’s desk from 46% to 78% (Lindsay
et al., 2004). Using a narrative description along with a doc-
tored photo of a hot air balloon ride, and presenting the nar-
rative ﬁrst, boosted recollective experiences considerably
(Wade, Garry, Nash, & Harper, 2010).
Applying a more stringent deﬁnition of recollective expe-
rience, by excluding images not experienced as memories
(Column 6), the percentage of participants who ‘recalled’
ranged from 0% for events selected for being implausible
(Pezdek et al., 1997, Study 2, receiving an enema) to 65%
(Lindsay et al., 2004, put Slime in teacher’s desk). The
weighted average was 25.45% (median 16%). The lowest
rate of ‘recall’ of an event not selected for being implausible,
going on a hot air balloon ride in New Zealand, was 5%
(French, Sutherland, & Garry, 2006). In contrast, other stud-
ies with the same investigator and implanting a ‘memory’ of
the same event in the same country achieved rates as high as
41% (Garry &Wade, 2005). Once again, there was consider-
able variation within studies, and part of this appeared to be
due to the provision of personal, self-relevant information.
Thus, inclusion of details like the name of a participant’s
teacher or photos of familiar individuals signiﬁcantly
boosted the rate of recollective experience (Desjardins &
Scoboria, 2007; Hessen-Kayﬁtz & Scoboria, 2012; Lindsay
et al., 2004).
Using the most stringent deﬁnition of recollection in
which there is some evidence for both recollective experi-
ence and conﬁdence in memory (Column 7), the percentage
of participants who ‘recalled’ ranged from 3% (Ost, Foster,
Creating false childhood memories
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Costall, & Bull, 2005) to 26% (Porter, Yuille, & Lehman,
1999), both studies using a variety of events. The upper rate
was considerably reduced relative to the previous column,
leading to a lower weighted average (15.35%) but a similar
median (12–15%).
The ﬁnal column of Table 4 documents the self-report
data collected by 11 of the 22 studies. Measures of autobio-
graphical belief indicate that mean conﬁdence that false
events had actually happened fell mainly in the lower half
of the belief scale. Omitted from Table 4 are data on belief
in true events that, when reported, was consistently higher
(Desjardins & Scoboria, 2007; Lindsay et al., 2004; Wade
et al., 2002). However, belief in a false event was much
higher in one study when a more stringent deﬁnition of a
false memory was used (Wade et al., 2002). Measures
attempting to distinguish between belief versus recollective
experience reported scores heavily weighted towards belief.
In one study, where investigator-based and self-ratings of
whether or not participants had a memory of a false event
could be directly compared (Otgaar et al., 2013), the investi-
gator rating (36%) was almost double the self-rating (20%).
Finally, average scores on measures of recollective experi-
ence and conﬁdence in memory for false events all fell at or
below the midpoint of the scales used. Even when clear mem-
ories were identiﬁed by the investigators, participants’ conﬁ-
dence in them was below the scale midpoint (Hyman &
Billings, 1998). Omitted from Table 4 are data on recollection
of true events that, when reported, was consistently higher
(Garry & Wade, 2005; Heaps & Nash, 2001; Hessen-Kayﬁtz
& Scoboria, 2012; Lindsay et al., 2004; Loftus & Pickrell,
1995; Ost et al., 2005; Pezdek et al., 1997; Porter et al.,
1999; Shaw & Porter, 2015; Strange et al., 2008). There were
no indications that studies using guided imagery obtained
higher self-report ratings of recollective experience or conﬁ-
dence in memory than studies that did not use guided imagery
and in one study where these conditions were directly com-
pared use of imagery led to numerically lower conﬁdence in
memory (Hyman & Pentland, 1996).
The unique contribution of the memory implantation stud-
ies has been to demonstrate that substantial numbers of col-
lege students can be encouraged to have false recollective
experiences when they are misled by authoritative sources
into believing that certain events happened to them in child-
hood. It is clear, however, that the results of these studies are
highly variable and that a high proportion of these ‘memo-
ries’ are speculative, partial or only in the form of images.
Many participants harbour doubts about their authenticity,
and they are not on average rated as being comparable with
memories of true events. Attempts to adopt more stringent
deﬁnitions of what constitutes a memory reduce the mean
percentage of participants who respond to the suggestions
from 47% to 15%.
There are a number of reasons to question whether all
these 15% would meet the requirements for a ‘full’ memory
set out by Brewer (1986). In terms of autobiographical
belief, the largest effect obtained was a 67% belief that an
event for which the participant reported a ‘clear memory’
had actually occurred (Wade et al., 2002). Other studies
found that self-ratings of having a ‘memory’ were much
lower even than the more stringent investigator ratingsTa
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(Otgaar et al., 2013), and even using stringent criteria recol-
lections identiﬁed by investigators were only given average
conﬁdence ratings by participants for their veracity (Hyman
& Billings, 1998). Similarly, Shaw and Porter (2015) found
a marked discrepancy between the ease of inducing experi-
ences rated by investigators as memories and the conﬁdence
participants had that they were real.
From their own data, Hyman and colleagues (Hyman
et al., 1995; Hyman & Pentland, 1996) have argued that
through repeated interviews and the social demands of the
experiment, misleading information is likely to be integrated
into true event memories. This begs the question of whether
additional details, frequently included in the criteria for false
memory judgements, reﬂect true memories of actual experiences
similar to, but not quite the same, as those being suggested.
Hyman and Billings (1998) in a study using visualisation pro-
vide such a memory as the one example of a clear false memory
of knocking over a punchbowl at a family friend’s wedding
(edited here):
Interview 2: …Like the table was a round table with a
couple of chairs sitting around it and were under the shade
of a tree. They were right there and there were some
drinks on the table, yeah, I think there was just drinks
on the table, I don’t think there was an actual pitcher or
anything. I think when I just bumped the table, or maybe
I bumped the glasses or something, it kind of just spilled
on them, so I think what I did was I bumped the table, I
liked bumped the table and the glasses tipped over on
them (p. 10).
One hint that the distinction between memory and imagi-
nation might not always be easy or possible for judges to
make from the false event description comes from our ﬁnd-
ing that, while guided imagery instructions led to signiﬁ-
cantly higher rates of investigator-based false memory
judgements, self-reports of belief in and memory of false
suggested events are similarly low for studies with and with-
out guided imagery instructions. This is consistent with the
source memory framework (Johnson, 2006), which predicts
that the act of imagination may create additional contents
that could be confused with real memories, but may also lead
the person to discount those contents as being due to the
mental operations employed. This suggests that when guided
imagery is used, unless participants are explicitly asked
about the extent to which their accounts reﬂect the produc-
tions of their imagination based on the experimenter’s
instructions (as opposed to actual memories), judgements
of false memories are at risk of being inﬂated.
A related issue to the possible miscategorisation of true
memories, because of their similarity to false events, is
whether some memories deemed false by investigators on
the authority of an older family member may have actually
happened (Desjardins & Scoboria, 2007; Porter et al.,
1999). Extensive reviews of documented childhood experi-
ences have found that people are more likely to have forgot-
ten past negative events they have experienced than to have
remembered events they have not (Brewin, Andrews, &
Gotlib, 1993; Hardt & Rutter, 2004). These reviews point
to evidence that younger and older people’s reports of their
childhoods are more in accord with those of independent
observers than with their parents’ reports. The agreement
between parents and their children on reports of stressful life
events is also weak (Sandberg et al., 1993). One reason for
this is that childhood experiences outside of the home may
not be known about or shared with parents. All this suggests
that events cannot always be assumed to be false on the
authority of a parent or older relative, because of them for-
getting and sometimes not being in a position to know.
The issue is very relevant to data from studies such as that
of Shaw and Porter (2015) that purport to show very high
percentages of participants generating false memories of
‘criminal acts’. It is not clear how many of these acts would
have been deemed criminal by independent observers
because the examples cited in the paper refer to everyday
events that are common in the lives of teenagers, such as mi-
nor scufﬂes and ﬁghts. But, underscoring the likelihood that
these might at least in part be based on real memories, a large
representative survey in the UK found that almost half of
young people aged 11 to 17 years reported committing at
least one criminal act (Beniart, Anderson, Lee, & Utting,
2002).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
With the controversy over child sexual abuse allegations in
mind, the main interest of the false memory studies has been
the extent to which individuals can come to accept the reality
of childhood events that never happened. In the absence of a
consistent approach to these questions, and attempting to
account both for the variability in the empirical data and
the acknowledged complexity of the judgements involved,
we applied a framework derived from Brewer (1986) that
discriminates different types of autobiographical memory
experience. In this ﬁnal section, we summarise the conclu-
sions suggested by the research ﬁndings.
The imagination inﬂation studies were by and large only
intended to assess autobiographical belief, so that the extent
to which these procedures produce full autobiographical
memories is unknown. However, reports of very large in-
creases in belief following imagination inﬂation might indi-
cate the creation of a full false memory. In the one study
reporting this information, this effect occurred for approxi-
mately 5% of imagined items (Garry et al., 1996). Such
information concerning individual variability is highly desir-
able, as mean differences do not identify how many partici-
pants respond strongly to the experimental procedures. We
would strongly encourage the routine reporting of these data
in the future.
The false feedback studies have gone to greater lengths to
assess recollective experience but achieved inconsistent
results, even when the same false event was suggested.
Measures have largely relied on a self-report and on partici-
pants’ understanding of the difference between belief and
memory, but with little systematic follow-up to conﬁrm the
validity of their responses. Given the known difﬁculty partic-
ipants have in interpreting questions about memory (Ost
et al., 2008; Sjöden, Granhag, Ost, & Roos af Hjelmsäter,
2009; Smeets et al., 2006; Smeets et al., 2009), it would
probably be premature to estimate the number of full
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autobiographical memories and to distinguish these from
actual experiences, for example, of eating asparagus or
yoghourt. It is interesting that despite these uncertainties, a
number of the studies succeeded in bringing about small be-
havioural changes in their participants, for example, chang-
ing the amount of available food consumed in the laboratory
(Scoboria, Mazzoni, & Jarry, 2008; Scoboria et al., 2012).
Where larger effects were obtained, for example, among
‘Believers’ who responded more strongly to the false feed-
back manipulations, they were mainly limited to the sugges-
tion of common experiences, for example, involving certain
sorts of food, or less distinctive experiences that as well as
being common were more open to interpretation (Sharman
& Calacouris, 2010). These results are consistent with the
source memory framework that predicts that importing
features of real experiences decreases the accessibility of
disconﬁrming information and makes it more likely that sug-
gested false events are accepted. The greater impact of the
deceptive information provided in the false feedback studies,
over imagination alone, is consistent with research on
persuasive communications that the degree of change in
attitudes and opinions is greater, the more credible or trust-
worthy the source of information (Pornpitakpan, 2004).
The memory implantation studies have gone to greater
lengths to deceive participants and have largely relied on
sources of evidence, such as parents, that fulﬁl all the criteria
for establishing trust in communication: expertness relevant
to the topic under discussion, reliability as an information
source and the possession of favourable intentions towards
the recipient (Gifﬁn, 1967). Although these methods, partic-
ularly when combined with the use of guided imagery, have
produced substantial quantities of recollective experiences,
their ability to produce full autobiographical memories is
more equivocal. From our review of studies using more
stringent deﬁnitions of recollection, the upper bound would
seem to be about 15% of participants, but for reasons
reviewed previously, particularly the discrepancies between
observer-ratings and self-ratings of memory experiences,
the actual ﬁgure may be lower.
These data are inconsistent with claims (e.g. Conway,
2013) that it is easy to create false memories of childhood
in others. Our review indicates that the majority of partici-
pants are resistant to the suggestions they are given, despite
repeated attempts to remember, the use of guided imagery,
doctored photos, the involvement of trusted others and what
Hyman and Pentland (1996) noted were the very high levels
of demand exercised on college students. Also, it has be-
come apparent from the false memory examples published
that those who do have recollective experiences are often
cautious and uncertain about them. The data strongly support
the source memory perspective that emphasises the complex
judgements involved in evaluating truth and falsity in auto-
biographical memory. Findings that participants also dis-
criminate appropriately in their ratings of clarity, conﬁdence,
and so on between true and false memories, and produce
more details for true than false events (Qin et al., 2008), also
testify to the appropriate operation of source memory
judgements.
Even if the numbers of full false memories created by
these procedures are few, it is still necessary to explain
how some people plainly are convinced that these events
have occurred. In this respect, it is worth quoting at some
length the observations of Ira Hyman, a pioneer in the ﬁeld
(Hyman & Pentland, 1996):
In all of our studies, the suggestions regarding an event do
not appear to be adopted wholesale. Rather what appears
to occur is that the individual considers the suggestions in
light of other self-knowledge (self-schema, personal
memories, etc.), and constructs a memory that is a combi-
nation of the suggestion plus related self-knowledge.
Hyman et al. (1995) and Hyman and Billings (1995) both
reported that individuals who talked about related self-
knowledge in the early interviews were more likely to cre-
ate a false memory by the end of the experiment (p. 112).
Consistent with this, several studies have demonstrated
that the inclusion within the experimental procedure of per-
sonal, self-relevant details like photographs of familiar indi-
viduals boosts recollective experience (Desjardins &
Scoboria, 2007; Hessen-Kayﬁtz & Scoboria, 2012; Lindsay
et al., 2004). It is plausible that these details act as cues,
aiding the retrieval of genuine self-knowledge and therefore
the subsequent construction of false memories in the way
described by Hyman.
The possibility raised by these researchers that even full
false memories are at least partially constructed from veridi-
cal autobiographical elements, and the independence of
measures of recollective experience from autobiographical
belief (Scoboria et al., 2014), has important implications for
future research. They suggest that there should be a more for-
mal way of establishing the existence of a personal memory
that takes into account the existence of a recollective experi-
ence together with conﬁdence in that memory. One way of
achieving this as suggested by Ost, Scoboria, Smeets and
others (Ost et al., 2008; Sjöden et al., 2009; Smeets et al.,
2006; Smeets et al., 2009) is that memory reports are
followed up with individual questioning designed to have
participants detail their conﬁdence in different elements of
their ‘memory’ and tomake corresponding source judgements.
It would also be valuable to test whether the increased false
memory rate produced by personally relevant details is due
to the retrieval of additional veridical elements that then ﬁnd
their way into recall of the suggested events or to the retrieval
of a true event similar to the one that is being suggested.
Given the discrepancies between investigator and self-
report judgements of false memories, future research could
also address how experimenters assess the content of false
memory descriptions when guided imagery is included in in-
structions to remember. In studies using this intervention,
participants, with no prior memory of the false event, are
asked to imagine details as if the event had actually hap-
pened, such as what it might have been like, what was seen,
who was present, and what the weather was like. The ques-
tion therefore arises whether experimenters incorporate
accounts of such imaginings into the content of the event de-
scription used to determine the existence of false memories.
Although the majority of studies distinguish images without
memories from actual memories in their rates of false mem-
ories, most studies do not make clear exactly how this is
performed.
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Conclusions and implications for memories of child
sexual abuse
Authors in the majority of the studies reviewed previously
have claimed that their research questions and data are rele-
vant to the controversy concerning false memories of child-
hood trauma, particularly child sexual abuse, being created
by therapists. It is therefore important to consider how their
procedures might be mirrored in the real world, how the dif-
ferent approaches to measurement should be described and
what might be appropriately concluded from this body of
work for presentation in a court of law.
One issue is the extent to which the experiments create
conditions that are similar to those that might occur in a
course of therapy. Thus, some therapists might plausibly
have patients try to recall by vividly imagining hypothetical
events, guiding them with speciﬁc questions and do this re-
peatedly, as in the imagination inﬂation studies. They might
provide plausibility information, for example, concerning
the high proportion of their patients who had been sexually
abused, or state that their patients’ symptoms made it likely
that they had been abused, as in the false feedback studies.
They would not be likely to provide more elaborate forms
of corroboration, such as the doctored photos or parental
statements that feature in the memory implantation studies.
Second, the plausibility of events suggested by therapists
depends crucially on the individuals’ knowledge of the set-
ting in which it may have occurred and the other persons
who may be involved. Despite the fact that the false memory
studies have not yet demonstrated, it is possible to implant
memories for events involving intimate transactions with
family and close others, an upbringing involving exposure
to chaotic, neglectful or sexually inappropriate others may
provide a background in which such suggestions are more
likely to be regarded as plausible and accepted. More prob-
lematic are memories for abuse that, as is often the case, is re-
peated, sometimes with very great frequency. A challenge for
the future will be to demonstrate that it is possible to implant
memories of a repeated event. For the present, this should be
noted as an important limitation in court reports.
Thirdly, it should be noted that as sources of information
therapists enjoy several advantages. If a successful therapeu-
tic relationship has been established, they are likely to be
trusted. High levels of trust would coincide with perceived
expertise, making their persuasive communications more
likely to be accepted (Gifﬁn, 1967). They are also in a posi-
tion to draw attention to, or encourage patients to retrieve,
very speciﬁc personally relevant details that might increase
the amount of recollective experience around suggested
events. Unlike parents, however, they are not in a position
to make statements from personal experience about what
did or did not happen during their patients’ childhoods, thus
reducing their informational value as sources for suggested
memories.
In referring to this literature in courtroom testimony, it
will be important to be explicit about the type of effects
being described (e.g. do they involve ‘full’ or ‘clear’ memo-
ries), and the size of any effects obtained (e.g. do they indi-
cate a belief that an event was more likely to have happened
than not). It should be noted that in these experiments,
repeated attempts to remember have been shown to lead to
the recovery of true autobiographical memories, as well as
to false memories containing true elements (Hyman et al.,
1995; Hyman & Pentland, 1996). Similarly, clinicians have
argued that in their practice, false memories tend not to arise
de novo but are often based in part on memories of real
events (Mollon, 1998). Other limitations need to be men-
tioned. For example, practical and ethical constraints mean
it is difﬁcult to assess the durability of false memories over
the periods of time typical of legal cases. Nor is there yet ev-
idence to show that false memories can be created with the
degree of conviction necessary to sustain protracted legal
proceedings involving the police and cross-examination in
the courts. On the other hand, therapists may have been able
to wield considerably more suggestive inﬂuence than was
possible in these brief laboratory studies.
As regards the terminology used in court reports, it is clear
that use of the term ‘false memory’ without qualiﬁcation or
explanation has the potential to be misleading. At minimum,
we recommend that experts wanting to refer to this literature
need to educate courts about the conditions needed to estab-
lish the presence of an autobiographical memory, and to
draw attention to the difference between autobiographical
belief, recollection, and conﬁdence in memory when
discussing the results of these studies. It will also be impor-
tant to describe the age of the participants and the nature of
the events that have been suggested or falsely recalled in
these studies and not to generalise from studies of food pref-
erence, say, to more distinctive events.
In summary, there seem to us to be a number of conclu-
sions that can and cannot be properly drawn from the
existing experimental literature. On the one hand, it has
provided a valuable demonstration that compelling false
memories can sometimes be created even with the restrictions
imposed by laboratory research. There are sufﬁcient grounds
to conclude that a (probably small) minority of people might
develop false memories of childhood events with these char-
acteristics and that any such memories might contain a mix-
ture of true and false elements. The fact that susceptibility
to false memories appears to be lower than has often previ-
ously been suggested does not diminish in any way the signif-
icant implications for the courtroom and the need to consider
the extremely damaging consequences that might ensue from
sincerely believed but false accusations. On the other hand,
we believe it cannot be concluded that false memories of
childhood events possessing these characteristics are com-
mon, that they are easy to suggest or implant or that the
majority of individuals are susceptible to them.
The literature we have reviewed provides valuable guide-
lines as to the conditions under which such false memories
are more likely. The situations of most concern are those in
which the following occur repeatedly and simultaneously:
(i) autobiographical belief is strengthened by plausibility in-
formation supplied by a trusted ﬁgure; (ii) recollective expe-
rience is increased by encouraging and guiding imagery, par-
ticularly when it is prompted by personally relevant details;
and (iii) conﬁdence in the veracity of the resulting experi-
ences is boosted by an uncritical acceptance of them. An ex-
ample would be that of therapists who attribute their patients’
symptoms to child sexual abuse in the absence of any explicit
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memory of it, instruct their patients in how to imagine this
scenario and accept uncritically any material produced by this
procedure. It should be emphasised, however, that false
memories do not necessarily require any external inﬂuence
and may sometimes arise from the spontaneous misinterpre-
tation of internal dreams or images (Brewin, Huntley, &
Whalley, 2012; Rassin, Merckelbach, & Spaan, 2001).
Nevertheless, it is of great concern that, unlike the great
majority of qualiﬁed clinical psychologists, some alternative
therapists continue to endorse mistaken ideas, for example,
that people’s conscious memories can go back to birth and
that hypnotically retrieved memories are reliable (Andrews
et al., 1999; Brewin & Andrews, 2014). These beliefs may
foster the inappropriate practices we and others have identi-
ﬁed. Given the generally accepted view by professional bod-
ies and independent commentators that recovered memories
may be genuine, false or a mixture of the two (Lindsay &
Read, 1995; Wright, Ost, & French, 2006), expert witnesses
are in a good position to evaluate the extent to which the
conditions conducive to false memories have or have not
been present prior to memory recovery. The research on cre-
ating false childhood memories has been extremely helpful
in illuminating these processes and constitutes an important
part of the knowledge base that experts testifying in historic
abuse cases must consider.
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